Public Financial Management and Reforms to the State Sector Act by Ball, Ian
Page 14 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 15, Issue 4 – November 2019
Ian Ball
Abstract
This article addresses changes to the Public Finance Act that have been proposed in the 
Public Finance (Wellbeing) Amendment Bill or are being considered for future legislative or 
administrative action. It discusses these changes in the context of the State Sector Act. The 
interrelationship between the two pieces of legislation is described, as are the implications 
of proposed changes to the Public Finance Act. These changes include requirements for the 
specification of objectives for wellbeing (outcomes) in the budget process and reporting of 
wellbeing by the Treasury at least every four years. Changes also include, potentially, greater 
flexibility in the nature of appropriations and the selection of the services that will be provided 
within an appropriation, as well as legislative support for the public service to operate in a more 
‘joined-up’, innovative and collaborative way. 
The article identifies as a strength of the proposed changes to the Public Finance Act and the 
State Sector Act that they maintain consistency between the two acts, but also identifies the risk 
of replacing one one-size-fits-all system with a different one-size-fits-all system, and considers 
a ‘two-track’ public management system as an alternative.
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This issue of Policy Quarterly is focused on the reforms proposed by the current government to the 
State Sector Act. It is important also to 
address proposed and potential changes 
to the Public Finance Act, given the 
interrelationship between these two pieces 
of legislation.
There is a common theme to the 
statements of the minister of finance and 
the minister of state services on why reform 
to the two acts is needed. The theme is that 
while both have had positive benefits, in 
terms both of the government’s fiscal 
performance and of the performance of 
the government in meeting the needs of 
citizens, the acts are now over 30 years old, 
the world has changed and become ever 
more complex and interrelated, and both 
acts need to be changed to be fit for purpose. 
In the words of the minister of finance: ‘It 
is time, 30 years on, to bring the Public 
Finance Act into the 21st century and put 
wellbeing and collaborative government at 
the centre of our approach’ (Robertson, 
2019).
This article will introduce the role of 
the Public Finance Act and describe the 
manner in which the State Sector Act and 
the Public Finance Act were designed to 
operate as ‘twins’. It will address a major set 
of changes made to the Public Finance Act 
since it was passed and the rationale for 
those changes. It will describe and assess 
key changes currently being proposed for 
the public financial management system, 
considering also the relationship to the 
changes concurrently being proposed for 
the State Sector Act.
The article draws on some of the 
contributions to the ‘New Zealand’s Public 
Finance Act at 30: lessons, achievements 
and future directions’ (PFA30) conference 
held at the end of July 2019 at Victoria 
University of Wellington.
Role of the Public Finance Act 
The Public Finance Act 1989 establishes 
the architecture for the public financial 
management system. This system serves a 
number of purposes. It establishes certain 
key components of the relationship 
between Parliament and the government, 
including the conditions under which the 
government can consume resources, when 
Parliament has authorised that action 
through an appropriation. The act also 
establishes the powers of the government 
in relation to borrowing, securities, 
derivatives, investment, banking and 
guarantees.
The Public Finance Act establishes the 
legislative arrangements for the 
government’s management of its overall 
fiscal position, including the specification 
of the principles of responsible fiscal 
management and requirements for 
documents that provide transparency for 
budget decisions. It establishes the ex post 
reporting and audit requirements for the 
government.
In establishing the nature and types of 
appropriation, the act determines key 
aspects of the functioning of the public 
financial management system at the 
departmental or Crown entity level, 
including the requirement to have an 
accrual-based accounting system that can 
record expenses or capital expenditure 
against an appropriation.1 The act also 
specifies the reporting requirements of 
departments (and departmental agencies) 
and Crown entities, which mirror and 
reinforce the nature of the appropriations.
One of the most significant features of 
the act, in relation to how it influenced the 
behaviour of both departments and 
ministers, is that it was outputs, rather than 
outcomes, which were specified as the basis 
for the appropriations.2 Outputs are the 
‘goods or services that are supplied by a 
department’ or other organisation (s2). 
Outcomes were, until 2013, defined in the 
act as ‘a state or condition of society, the 
economy, or the environment; and (b) 
includes a change in that state or condition’ 
(ibid.). The requirement to specify 
appropriations in output terms was a 
fundamental change mandated by the 
Public Finance Act, and one that has a 
number of  challenges in its 
implementation.3
The public financial management 
system can be seen as having two key roles 
in relation to the performance of the 
government:4 fiscal performance, relating 
to the government’s aggregate fiscal 
position; and outcome achievement, 
encompassing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the government’s activities.
In relation to fiscal performance, there 
is little debate over the effectiveness of the 
Public Finance Act. The fiscal performance 
and position of the New Zealand 
government are very strong relative to the 
decades (of deficits) before the introduction 
of the legislation. They are also very strong 
relative to comparable countries such as 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the United States (Ball, 2019). And there is 
international recognition of the level of 
transparency associated with the fiscal 
management system in New Zealand.5 On 
this dimension of performance, the present 
government seems satisfied with the 
functioning of the act.
As was noted by the minister of finance 
and other speakers at the PFA30 conference, 
New Zealand also ranks very highly in 
international indices of standard of living 
and social progress, and also in the quality 
of the public service. Or, as the minister of 
state services noted in his overview of the 
proposals for reform of the State Sector Act:
New Zealand’s public service performs 
well by international standards in 
responsiveness to government, 
effectiveness for New Zealanders, and 
integrity. The proposals in these papers 
are not about fixing a system that is 
fundamentally broken. Rather, they are 
about improving from a high base; 
ensuring the public service is making 
the biggest possible difference to the 
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wellbeing of New Zealanders, delivering 
services that are easy to access and 
joined up around their needs, and 
serving an ever more diverse and 
changing community. (Hipkins, 2019c)
Notwithstanding the performance of 
the public management system in New 
Zealand, both this and previous 
governments have identified issues with 
outcome achievement and the efficiency of 
the system. Consequently, the Public 
Finance Act has been amended 58 times 
since 1989 (Brumby, 2019) and the State 
Sector Act 13 times since its enactment in 
1988 (Hipkins, 2019c, para 13). A key issue 
of concern is the output focus of 
appropriations and accountabilities, and 
the conclusion that this focus encourages 
departments and Crown entities to operate 
in ‘silos’ and creates barriers to 
collaboration. These issues, apparently, 
have not been adequately addressed by 
successive amendments to the acts, and are 
a key basis for the major reforms now 
proposed.
The State Sector Act and the Public Finance 
Act 
At the time the State Sector Act and the 
Public Finance Act were enacted it was 
intended that they would operate in 
tandem and be mutually reinforcing. 
This reflected the view that state sector 
employment and financial management 
arrangements were subsystems within a 
broader public management system; and 
that management systems work better 
when their various components operate in 
an integrated fashion, providing consistent 
signals, accountabilities and incentives to 
actors within the system. The Treasury’s 
briefing to the incoming government in 
1987, which articulated the rationale for 
the proposed changes, stated:
When considering reform of the public 
sector it is essential to recognise the 
mutually reinforcing nature of these 
elements and to avoid piecemeal 
change that could weaken or distort the 
incentives of those given responsibility 
for management decisions to act in a 
way consistent with the objectives they 
have been given. (Treasury, 1987, vol.1, 
p.55)
In the financial management context, 
the implications of seeking an integrated 
system were most radically reflected in the 
following statement:
If we are to move to an accrual 
accounting system we would also need 
an accrual budgeting system so that 
actual results can be measured against 
plans and budget. The accounting 
system would need to be on the same 
basis as the budgeting system to avoid 
the possibility of conflicting objectives. 
An accrual budgeting system is one 
which is expressed in terms of costs to 
be incurred rather than in funds to be 
obligated or spent. (ibid., pp.83–4)
This recognition of the need to have 
coherence within the accounting, budgeting 
and appropriations systems was fully 
reflected in the Public Finance Act.6
The aim of having consistent and 
mutually reinforcing elements could also 
be seen in the way ‘performance’ was 
defined, specified and measured for 
purposes of both acts. Specifically, the 
concept of ‘performance’ envisaged clear 
distinctions between: ‘ownership 
performance’ and ‘purchase performance’;7 
inputs, outputs and outcomes;8 and 
Crown and department.9 These 
distinctions were embedded in the nature 
of appropriations as well as in the 
performance management documentation 
under the State Sector Act. For example, 
‘outputs’ were a key component in the 
specification of departmental and chief 
executive performance and accountability 
within State Sector Act performance 
management arrangements, as well as 
being a basis for budgeting, appropriation 
and reporting10 under the Public Finance 
Act. 
A further illustration of the 
interrelationship between the two pieces 
of legislation can be seen in the process 
through which the Public Finance Act was 
implemented. The move to accrual 
budgeting and accounting necessitated a 
dramatic improvement in departmental 
accounting systems. The decision-making 
authority given to chief executives by the 
State Sector Act enabled them to establish 
accrual accounting systems within 18 
months. Such a rapid transition would not 
have been possible prior to the act.11 
Changes to the Public Finance Act since 
enactment
It was noted above that the Public Finance 
Act has been amended 58 times since 
enactment. While a number of these 
amendments are relatively trivial, others 
have greater significance. One significant 
set of changes relates to the manner 
in which performance intentions and 
Public Financial Management and Reforms to the State Sector Act 
Figure 1
Reporting Requirements of the Public Finance Act - a history
The Original Act “Set out the link between the classes of outputs to be purchased by 
the Crown and the Government’s desired outcomes
1992 Amendment “The performance targets and other measures by which the 
performance of the Crown entity or group may be judged in relation to 
its objectives
1994 Amendment “A Statement of objectives specifying the performance for each class 
of outputs forecast to be achieved as agreed with the Minister
2004 Amendment “Future operating intentions .. explaining ... nature and scope of the 
department’s functions and intended operations, the specific impacts, 
outcomes, or objectives that the department seeks to achieve or to 
contribute to ...
2013 Amendment “A concise explanation of how performance against the appropriation 
will be assessed ... 
Information on the department’s strategic intentions that ... set out 
the strategic objectives that the department intends to achieve or 
contribute to
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achievements are specified. Warren (2019) 
presents the changes in Figure 1. 
This figure captures the continuing 
struggle to manage ‘performance’ in 
relation to outputs (services) and, more 
particularly, outcomes, or wellbeing.12 In 
the original act both concepts were seen 
as being important to making policy 
choices, with outputs being one form of 
intervention the government could take 
to achieve its desired outcomes. When 
ministers, through the planning and 
budgeting process, had determined the 
outputs they wished departments to 
deliver, those outputs became the basis for 
formal chief executive and departmental 
accountability ; outcomes, while 
constituting the rationale for government 
action, were not the basis for such 
accountability.13 
In the period since the act was 
implemented, there has been a consistent 
ambition to emphasise the role of outcomes 
in representing the fundamental purpose 
of public services and to incorporate 
outcomes more directly into the formal 
management system. There has been a 
parallel pattern of diminishing the 
significance of outputs.14 This ambition 
has been articulated consistently in reviews 
of the public fincancial management 
system and given effect through successive 
changes to the system.15
The legislative change in 2013, designed 
to give greater focus to outcome 
achievement, resulted in the introduction 
of a new type of appropriation, adding to 
those already existing. This ‘multi-category 
appropriation’ is specified as follows:
2 or more categories of 1 or more of the 
following:
(i) output expenses:
(ii) other expenses:
(iii) non-departmental capital 
expenditure. (s7A(1)(g))
The intent of this somewhat inelegant 
specification of an appropriation type is 
clarified in the following section, where it 
is specified that the appropriation must be 
approved by the minister of finance and 
‘must include only categories of expenses 
or non-departmental capital expenditure 
that contribute to a single overarching 
purpose’ (s7B(b)).
In effect, this amendment enables 
appropriations for expenses of different 
types, including different output categories 
and non-departmental capital expenditure, 
so long as those expenses ‘contribute to a 
single overarching purpose’. ‘Purpose’ is 
not defined in the act, though Treasury 
describes the intent of this set of 
amendments as being to ‘lift the strategic 
focus of statements of intent to drive a 
clearer focus on results and outcomes’ 
(Treasury, 2019).
Interestingly, the 2013 amendments 
removed the definition of ‘outcome’ 
(though not ‘output’) from the act. 
Irrespective of this,16 the concept is still in 
current usage, whether described as 
‘outcome’ or ‘wellbeing’.
At the very least, the 2013 amendment 
enables appropriations, and the associated 
accountability, to be defined in terms of a 
set of expenses and capital expenditure 
designed to achieve a single purpose or 
outcome. This is a fundamental change to 
the act, arguably the most significant since 
it was enacted. In an important way, it 
reverts to the programme budgeting 
approach which New Zealand implemented 
in the Public Finance Act 1977, in that a 
programme comprised a set of activities 
designed to achieve a single outcome, and 
programmes were the basis for 
appropriation.
The fundamental problem with 
programme budgeting that the Public 
Finance Act sought to address was that it 
oversimplifies the nature of the relationship 
between outputs and outcomes. It does this 
by identifying a number of different 
activities (or outputs) that contribute to 
one outcome, and then formatting the 
budget, with its associated accountabilities, 
on that basis. However, the relationship 
between outputs and outcomes is not many 
outputs to one outcome, as the programme 
concept (and the definition of a multi-
category appropriation) implies, but often 
many to many, and also complex and 
dynamic, and with interrelationships 
between different outcomes (health, 
education and income, for example). An 
activity or output that contributes to a 
health outcome may also contribute to 
educational and income outcomes. 
Therefore, relating an appropriation to a 
single outcome had the effect of ignoring 
the other outcomes to which the set of 
outputs contributed.
The rationale for the Public Finance Act 
focusing on outputs rather than outcomes 
within the accountability and 
appropriations structures was outlined by 
the author in a 1992 presentation, in which 
it was concluded:
There are some international precedents 
for giving outcomes a higher profile in 
the design of government management 
systems than has occurred in the New 
Zealand reforms. There are also some 
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good reasons for being sceptical about 
any attempt at comprehensive and 
detailed specification of outcomes, any 
attempt to construct a budget on an 
outcomes basis, or any attempt to hold 
managers explicitly accountable for 
outcomes. (Ball, 1992)
In the same paper it was noted that the 
Government Accounting Standards Board 
in the United States had addressed this 
issue in its 1990 research report Service 
Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting:
The extent to which public agencies can 
affect or control the outcomes and 
efficiency of the service being measured 
is of continuing concern to public 
officials. As with financial performance, 
SEA reporting does not indicate why 
the results are what they are, or what 
or who has caused or contributed to 
those results. These questions can be 
answered only, if at all, through in-
depth evaluation and investigation. 
Fortunately, for public disclosure of 
SEA information, as with financial 
information, it is acceptable that the 
information presented should be 
appropriate and accurate in measuring 
results. This information is not 
expected to indicate clearly who or 
what caused the reported performance 
to be at the levels it is. (Government 
Accounting Standards Board, 1990, 
p.18) 
This conclusion recognises the 
challenges and limitations in using 
outcome information for accountability 
purposes, and reflects the rationale for the 
manner in which outcomes were, earlier, 
addressed in the Public Finance Act. 
However, it nevertheless supported the 
reporting of outcomes provided the 
measurement is ‘appropriate and accurate’. 
The Public Finance Act did not require 
such reporting of outcomes, either at the 
departmental17 or whole-of-government 
level. This is a key element of the changes 
the government is now proposing. This 
issue is discussed further in the following 
section.
It is very significant that the 2013 
amendment changed the act in a manner 
which enabled outcome-based 
appropriations, albeit the specific wording 
requires such an appropriation to 
‘contribute to a single overarching purpose’. 
Despite the changes, in the June 2019 
speech announcing his intention to 
institute public service reforms, State 
Services Minister Chris Hipkins stated: 
When I came into this job as Minister 
of State Services, I said the Public 
Service needs to be adaptive and 
responsive to the changing needs of 
citizens. I talked about what we needed 
to do to make this happen. These 
include moving from outputs to 
outcomes, even though outcomes are 
harder to measure and harder to 
control. (Hipkins, 2019a)
The minister’s statement reflects the 
continued ambition to find a way to place 
more focus on outcomes within the formal 
management system and less focus on 
outputs, notwithstanding the earlier efforts 
to achieve this ‘rebalancing’.
Proposed changes to the Public Finance Act
There are two key areas in which the 
government has indicated a desire to 
reform the public financial management 
system. The first is to establish an 
independent fiscal institution, and the 
second is to embed intergenerational 
wellbeing into that system. Both these 
topics have been the subject of discussion 
papers issued by Treasury (Treasury, 
2018a, 2018b). However, the proposal for 
an independent fiscal institution will not 
be discussed further here. It is noteworthy 
that in his conference speech the minister 
of finance did not refer to the independent 
fiscal institution in relation to either the 
amendments to the Public Finance Act 
that he will ‘soon’ introduce18 or the 
ongoing work programme he described.19 
Rather, he stated:
Our modernisation of the public 
finance system, addressing its current 
limitations, is a key element of aligning 
the public sector to a wellbeing 
approach. The work programme 
includes three important themes – they 
are:
•	 Firstly,	changing	the	overarching	
framework for measuring success 
and identifying the priorities, 
through amendments to embed 
wellbeing in the Public Finance Act, 
as well as the government’s broader 
commitment to sustainable 
development goals
•	 Secondly,	 changing	 the	 financial	
management framework, to 
increase flexibility, encourage 
collaboration and support and 
enable a more strategic focus. This 
includes changes to the 
appropriation system and a different 
approach to planning and reporting
•	 And	 thirdly,	 rethinking	 the	
approach to the Budget, so that we 
look at existing as well as new 
spending, and create more space to 
focus on the challenges and trade-
offs needed to improve wellbeing 
for all New Zealanders. (Robertson, 
2019)
All three themes envisage changes to 
the Public Finance Act. The first suggests 
that the act will be amended to establish a 
process for specifying wellbeing objectives 
alongside financial and economic 
objectives, and to specify the associated 
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reporting requirements. The second refers 
to ‘changes to the appropriation system’ 
which may, or may not, require changes to 
the act.20 The third theme seems less 
obviously to imply changes to the Public 
Finance Act, as the key focus of this theme 
is better examination of the ‘baseline’ level 
of expenditure. The fixed nominal baseline 
and allowances approach to the budget 
process is not specified in the act, and could 
be changed without amending it. However, 
the minister also noted that within this 
theme the appropriation system could be 
changed (Robertson, 2019).
There is a clear relationship between 
the three themes: all three seek to make the 
public financial management system 
perform better in achieving outcomes 
(wellbeing).
Theme 1: Overarching framework for 
measuring success
In relation to the first theme, the minister 
stated that he:
will soon introduce legislation to 
amend the Public Finance Act so it 
includes two key changes: 
•	 The	Government	will	be	required	
to set out how its wellbeing and 
fiscal objectives will guide its 
Budget
•	 The	Treasury	will	be	required	to	
report on the state of current and 
future wellbeing in New Zealand, 
at least every four years
These changes recognise that we 
expect wellbeing monitoring to evolve 
over time as theory, evidence and data 
availability develop and improve. 
Embedding wellbeing in the Public 
Finance Act may be contentious, depending 
on how it is done. Scott (2019) identified 
the risk of politicising the Treasury, if, as is 
proposed, Treasury is responsible for 
reporting on the achievement of wellbeing 
objectives. Differing views on New 
Zealand’s wellbeing can often be factually 
supported, whether defined as outcomes 
(i.e. ‘a state or condition of society, the 
economy, or the environment’) or through 
a framework such as the Living Standards 
Framework. Descriptions of wellbeing and 
assessments of wellbeing status will always 
be the subject of intense political debate.
However, ‘embedding wellbeing’ may 
also be seen as entirely consistent with the 
act, or as a logical development from the 
planning, budgeting and reporting 
framework established by it. Embedding 
wellbeing in the Public Finance Act is 
entirely consistent with the idea that 
outcomes are, and should be, the ultimate 
focus of public service activity. Outputs are 
one means by which outcomes are achieved, 
along with transfers, regulation, taxation 
and ownership. The act as originally 
enacted envisaged that ministers would 
choose the outputs (or other interventions) 
that they considered would best achieve 
their desired outcomes. ‘Embedding 
wellbeing’ can be seen as elaborating the 
specific aspects of wellbeing that will be 
considered in the budget planning and 
decision-making process and be the subject 
of formal ex post reporting requirements.
There is a significant respect in which 
embedding wellbeing into the Public 
Finance Act is a logical development of the 
framework underpinning the act. The 
framework envisages that an entity should 
state at the beginning of a period the 
performance it is seeking to achieve during 
that period. At the end of the period there 
should be reporting against the desired 
performance, which enables accountability 
for performance to be demonstrated. 
In relation to departments, this 
accountability is expressed through 
reporting on both ‘ownership’ performance, 
primarily through the financial statements, 
and performance in relation to operations 
and strategic intentions (formerly outputs), 
which will normally include reporting on 
services delivered as well, often, as 
information related to outcomes. To 
reinforce the importance of both 
dimensions of performance (ownership 
and strategic intentions), the act requires 
that both dimensions be subject to audit 
in departmental annual reports.
The situation is different for the 
government as a whole, the Crown.21 At the 
beginning of a year, as part of the budget 
documentation, the government produces 
forecast financial statements for the next 
three years. At the end of the year the 
government produces a set of financial 
statements, comparing actual performance 
and position against the forecasts,22 and 
these statements are audited. The financial 
statements constitute the ex post reporting 
on the government’s fiscal performance.23 
There is no reporting on the government’s 
performance in terms of outcome 
achievement or wellbeing equivalent to 
that required of departments in relation to 
strategic intentions or service delivery. In 
this sense, reporting on outcomes or 
wellbeing can be seen as a logical extension 
of the framework underpinning the Public 
Finance Act. In the same way that 
departments are accountable for delivery 
of the agreed services and are required to 
report on this, the government as a whole 
is accountable for outcomes, and under the 
proposed reforms would be required to 
report on their achievement. 
There have been initial moves in this 
direction, with an amendment to the 
Public Finance Act requiring reporting on 
child poverty, the proposals outlined in the 
Treasury’s discussion paper on wellbeing, 
and the proposed requirement that ‘The 
Treasury will be required to report on the 
state of current and future wellbeing in 
New Zealand, at least every four years’. The 
introduction of the Public Finance 
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(Wellbeing) Amendment Bill confirms the 
intent expressed in the earlier discussion 
paper. 
However, the way forward could be 
more coherent with the underlying 
structure of the act in at least two ways. First, 
part 3 of the Public Finance Act deals with 
‘Reporting by Government reporting entity’, 
and states the reporting requirements for 
monthly and annual financial statements, 
and the associated audit requirements. 
Reporting ex post on outcome achievements 
would logically sit within or alongside part 
3 of the act.24 As discussed above, attributing 
causation to changes in outcomes or 
wellbeing makes accountability more 
difficult than is the case with reporting on 
outputs (or operations and activity) by 
departments. Nevertheless, reporting on 
outcomes targeted by government provides 
useful information on the extent to which 
its priority outcome or wellbeing targets are 
being met.
The proposed requirement that 
Treasury ‘report on the state of current and 
future wellbeing in New Zealand, at least 
every four years’ has two aspects that 
warrant comment. First, if reporting were 
done only every four years,25 there would 
be a disjunction with both the annual 
budget cycle and the electoral term. From 
a management perspective, it would mean 
there was infrequent feedback on levels of 
achievement26 and therefore a lack of 
information as a basis for re-evaluating 
prior budget decisions and reprioritising 
if required. Arguably, one of the reasons 
the Public Finance Act has been successful 
in terms of fiscal management is that there 
is feedback on performance on a monthly 
basis, allowing (indeed encouraging) 
management to respond in a timely fashion 
to emerging circumstances and events. On 
this basis, reporting on at least an annual 
basis would seem desirable. While it may 
be that for some outcomes relatively little 
or no change could be observed within a 
year, in other cases more rapid change 
would be expected. Indeed, it may be that 
outcomes change as a result of factors other 
than government interventions, and this 
may also be relevant information.
Further, with a three-yearly electoral 
cycle, it could emerge that the government 
in office at the time the reporting on 
wellbeing takes place was not in 
government for the majority of the 
reporting period. Insofar as the text would 
necessarily describe and explain the 
wellbeing achievements (reflected in the 
data in Indicators Aotearoa New Zealand 
or the Living Standards Dashboard), this 
opens significant scope for alternative 
interpretations, which could make the 
reporting highly contentious and diminish 
both public confidence in the reporting 
and the longevity of the wellbeing focus.
Second, there is the question of which 
organisation(s) should have responsibility 
for reporting on wellbeing performance 
and in which document(s) should this 
reporting take place. As stated above, a 
distinction between ex ante and ex post 
reporting is a key element of the Public 
Finance Act framework. Hence, the budget 
documentation should articulate the 
wellbeing priorities and objectives the 
government is seeking to achieve through 
the budget, alongside the fiscal objectives. 
A step was taken in this direction in the 
2019 Wellbeing Budget.
Given the concerns above, it is not clear 
which organisation or organisations 
should best be responsible for the ex post 
Figure 2: Using a wellbeing approach to improve strategic decision-making
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reporting – the element of the process that 
closes the accountability loop – 
notwithstanding the amendment bill’s 
specification that this be Treasury’s 
responsibility. 
The Treasury and Statistics New 
Zealand have produced a diagram (Figure 
2) which depicts the components of a 
wellbeing approach to strategic decision 
making. This identifies a number of 
different forms of reporting: Indicators 
Aotearoa New Zealand, the Living 
Standards Dashboard and the Living 
Standards Report, as well domain reporting 
and domain monitoring by sectors and 
agencies. However, the text in the ‘Cabinet 
and Committees’ level of the diagram 
suggests that the data and information 
referred to in the document is intended for 
decision-making purposes, rather than ex 
post reporting.
The discussion paper issued by Treasury 
in 2018 considered reporting wellbeing 
within a number of budgetary documents, 
and stated: 
As a part of developing our under-
standing of how to measure and report 
on wellbeing, the Government is 
piloting non-legislative options for 
embedding a wellbeing focus in public 
sector departments’ strategic planning 
and performance reporting, before 
considering further legislative changes. 
(Treasury, 2018a)
This suggests the government is 
correctly conscious of the difficulty of 
finding the right approach to ex post 
reporting of wellbeing. Insofar as outcomes 
are affected by all parts of the Crown 
reporting entity, there might be a case for 
the production of an annual outcomes 
report being managed through 
collaboration by the central agencies and 
Statistics New Zealand.
Theme 2: Changing the financial 
management framework
The second theme identified by the minister 
is to change the financial management 
framework ‘to increase flexibility, encourage 
collaboration and support and enable a 
more strategic focus. This includes changes 
to the appropriation system and a different 
approach to planning and reporting’ 
(Robertson, 2019).27
The minister elaborated by identifying 
three problems in the performance of the 
existing system:
•	 the	 difficulty	 and	 transaction	 costs	
associated with moving funding from 
one ‘pool’ to another, reallocating 
resources from less to more effective 
programmes;
•	 the	difficulty	of	reporting	in	one	place	
the result of collaborative efforts of 
multiple departments or agencies in 
achieving a single outcome, illustrated 
by the example of ‘a joint venture of 
eight government agencies who work 
on reducing and eliminating domestic 
violence’ (ibid.);
•	 the	cost	and	ineffectiveness	of	agencies’	
strategic planning processes, where 
strategic plans ‘end up sitting on the 
shelf gathering dust’. The minister 
indicated that the government was 
‘testing a fundamentally different 
approach with one or two pilots where 
each pilot will put a spotlight on a 
specific long-term issue’.
The way the government seeks to 
address these three problems is 
underpinned by a common proposition: 
that government performance will be 
enhanced if there is flexibility to reallocate 
resources between activities that are carried 
out by different agencies acting 
collaboratively in pursuit of single 
outcome-based objectives, and that the 
formal aspects of the planning, budgeting, 
operations and reporting of the joint 
activities should be aggregated in line with 
the ‘specific long-term issue’.28
While this proposition may be valid for 
a certain subset of the government’s 
activities, it may not be optimal for all. 
Below, consideration is given to the 
possibility that the management system 
needs to accommodate a two-track 
approach.
Theme 3: Rethinking the approach to the 
budget
In relation to the third theme, the minister 
noted:
My experience of the past two Budgets 
is that they involved quite high 
transaction costs focussed on a 
relatively small proportion of 
government spending. Ministers also 
had little visibility of what was being 
funded through baselines and where 
there were opportunities to stop some 
things to fund other new initiatives.
As a small first step, we will consider 
bringing in:
•	 Single	departmental	output	
appropriations for small 
departments and consolidating 
small appropriations to provide 
more flexibility to move funding 
between programmes and output 
classes (work that will be phased 
over two years)
Looking further ahead, we will 
consider
•	 Aggregating	non-departmental	
appropriations aligned to high-
level outcome areas
•	 Introducing	multi-department,	
multi-Minister appropriations, 
allowing multiple departments to 
be responsible – collaboratively 
– for what they achieve. (Robertson, 
2019)
In the statements above, a number of 
issues are raised:
•	 a	concern	for	the	level	of	transaction	
costs in the budget process;
The level of 
transaction costs  
and the nature  
and extent of  
scrutiny in the  
budget process  
are affected by the 
Public Finance Act 
primarily through  
its specification  
of the nature of the 
appropriation 
structure. 
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•	 the	relatively	small	proportion	of	the	
total budget that is scrutinised in the 
annual budget process;
•	 the	degree	of	flexibility	a	department	
should have to adjust the set of outputs 
it produces within a single 
appropriation; and
•	 whether	 the	 appropriation	 system	
should have an even greater ‘outcome’ 
focus than that granted by multi-
category appropriations, by allowing 
multi-department and multi-minister 
appropriations.
The level of transaction costs and the 
nature and extent of scrutiny in the budget 
process are affected by the Public Finance 
Act primarily through its specification of 
the nature of the appropriation structure. 
However, the manner in which the 
government chooses to administer its 
budget process, within the requirements 
of the act, is the major determinant of the 
costs. As in any budget system, there is a 
trade-off between the desire for scrutiny 
and contest, and the possibility of 
efficiencies and reallocations, on the one 
hand, and the desire to minimise the 
transaction costs on the other.
At one extreme, an organisation could 
adopt a variant of a ‘zero-based budgeting’ 
approach. This approach forces an annual 
reconsideration of all existing expenditure, 
and is seen as being of value in facilitating 
the reallocation of resources to more 
productive uses. In reality, the transaction 
costs of a zero-based budgeting process 
militate against its full implementation,29 
though its methodology is consistent with 
the desire of the government to give greater 
consideration to baseline expenditure. An 
incremental approach to budgeting, 
essentially taking last year’s expenditure as 
given, will certainly be less costly to 
administer, but leaves on the table the value 
that could be extracted from increasing 
efficiency and reallocating expenses to 
interventions that make a greater 
contribution to outcomes.
The fixed nominal baseline system that 
has been used in New Zealand errs very 
much towards the incremental end of the 
spectrum, where, as the minister notes:
About 98 per cent of government 
expenditure – or $89 billion – sits 
outside the annual Budget process, and 
yet – as I’ve already mentioned – we 
spend most of our time assessing how 
to allocate the next two per cent or so 
located at the margin through each 
Budget. (ibid.) 
The system of fixed nominal baselines 
has at least two effects. First, it limits the 
amount of analysis and scrutiny that needs 
to be undertaken in relation to baseline 
expenses, reducing transaction costs. 
However, it also reduces the incentives on 
departments to re-examine the value 
generated by services within the baseline. 
Certainty of forward funding reduces the 
incentive to seek greater efficiency or more 
innovative services. 
The dilemma the minister faces is that 
he wishes to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with the budget process while 
increasing the scrutiny of baseline 
expenditure. In his speech he indicated that 
the intent is to look at ‘baselines and 
marginal expenditure together to better 
prioritise what will improve wellbeing for 
New Zealanders, and ensure sustainable 
resourcing to deliver it’. He indicated that 
the government was looking to achieve this 
through baseline reviews, where, ultimately, 
‘80 per cent of baselines are covered by a 
review every few years’.
The following quotation suggests that 
the minister considers that a significant 
element of the transaction costs arises from 
the number of appropriations:
There are currently about 840 appro-
priations, and more than a thousand if 
you [count] the components of multi-
category appropriations, which are 
reported on
More than half – 50 per cent – of 
the money is in just two per cent of the 
appropriations 
45 per cent of appropriations – 
again, almost half – have less than $5m 
in each appropriation (less than one per 
cent of the money). (ibid.)
However, when assessing transaction 
costs, the size of the transaction is also 
significant. Using the minister’s numbers, 
the mean transaction size for the 2% of 
appropriations that constitute 50% of 
government expenditure is approximately 
$2.3 billion. These, obviously, are very 
significant amounts and the process of 
establishing the nature of what is to be 
delivered, issues of distribution, assignment 
of risks, etc. can be expected to generate 
substantial transaction costs.30 The mean 
transaction size for the other 98% of the 
appropriations is $46.5 million, and even 
this amount would seem to warrant serious 
analysis and scrutiny. 
The need for examination of the base 
implies some increase in transaction costs, 
whether that examination is conducted 
annually or selectively over a number of 
years. Consistent with this, it is reasonable 
Figure 3
Outcome-focussed 
Collaboration
Output-focussed Specialisation
Expectations Achievement of Shared Goals Delivery of Services
Operating Model Value-add through 
collaboration
Value-add through specialist 
skill
Information needs Fast feedback loops from 
citizens
Fast feedback loops from system
Accountability for Commitment to shared goals 
and mana to achieve them
The quality, quantity and cost of 
the provision of services
Accountable to Citizens before hierarchy Hierarchy before citizens
Accountability direction Horizontal between 
collaborators
Up through the hierarchy
Trade-offs generally favour Effectiveness Efficiency
Funding Collective / Relationships Services
Public Financial Management and Reforms to the State Sector Act 
Policy Quarterly – Volume 15, Issue 4 – November  2019 – Page 23
to look to reduce transaction costs where 
it is efficient to do so. However, the 
transaction costs associated with the 
efficient allocation of approximately $90 
billion should, if the allocation process is 
rigorous, be significant. The test is whether 
the transaction costs are warranted by the 
results of the allocation process, not by the 
ease with which departments can comply 
with the requirements of the process.
Same problem, alternative solution. Or is it?
The ministers of state services and finance 
both acknowledge that the existing 
acts have been successful, but identify 
performance issues that remain. As 
described above, the minister of finance 
is proposing a work programme and 
legislative amendments that have the 
public financial management system 
focus more on outcomes, give ministers 
and departments greater flexibility in 
selecting outputs within appropriations, 
and support collaborative work between 
agencies.
While it might be argued that much of 
what the minister seeks could be achieved 
within the existing legislation, the changes 
are predicated on the view that legislative 
changes can better support the direction 
in which he aims to take the system.
Warren (2019) described two different 
approaches to managing activities within 
the public sector, which he describes as 
‘outcome-focused collaboration’ and 
‘output-focused specialisation’. The 
differences between the two approaches are 
summarised in Figure 3.
Warren also refers to organisations 
which operate a ‘two-track’ system in 
which they manage different types of 
service or activity in different ways, 
specifically by managing some functions 
through hierarchies and other functions 
through networks. 
Warren’s contention is that the public 
management system currently operates in 
a hierarchical manner and that this is 
suitable for a subset of public services 
which are more routine in nature, and are 
produced more efficiently through output-
focused specialisation. However, for other 
activities such a hierarchical approach 
leads to the issues that are problematic in 
the current system: the creation of siloes, 
lack of collaboration and the need for 
greater flexibility. For these other activities, 
which address complex problems that 
require learning, adaption and 
experimentation, outcome-focused 
collaboration, operating through networks 
rather than hierarchies, is more effective.31 
An important element of the rationale 
for the State Sector Act and the Public 
Finance Act was that the context and 
managerial issues confronting different 
departments are very different, and the 
pre-existing, highly centralised, approach 
did not allow for managers to be responsive 
to those differences. However, as has been 
observed,32 there are elements of the public 
financial management system that are 
themselves insufficiently responsive to the 
differences between those services that can 
most effectively be delivered through 
outcome-focused collaboration and those 
that can best be delivered through output-
focused specialisation.33
The changes being proposed for the 
State Sector Act seek to move the whole 
public service from output-focused 
specialisation to outcome-focused 
collaboration. The changes proposed by 
the minister of finance are also supportive 
of outcome-focused collaboration. 
However, the specific nature of some of the 
changes34 seems at least to open the 
possibility of tailored application, 
depending on the nature of the activity, 
even if the language used by the minister’s 
implies the universal application envisaged 
by the State Sector Act reforms. 
As currently described, the changes are 
not explicitly confined to a subset of public 
services, which opens the possibility that, 
if applied too widely, outcome-focussed 
collaboration could be used where a more 
hierarchical approach would be superior. 
This is certainly the intent of the State 
Sector Act approach. However, if the Public 
Finance Act changes are enabling, rather 
than applying to all services, then the 
changes may be adopted only in those areas 
where outcome-focused collaboration is 
the superior approach. Were this to be the 
case, the solution proposed by Warren 
might still be achieved, albeit that there is 
not within the current proposals a clearly 
defined two-track system. 
The place of outputs in the system
The minister noted in his speech to the 
conference that the Public Finance Act 
when it was first introduced ‘shone a 
light on what government was spending 
money on’ (Robertson, 2019). It did this 
by requiring departments to specify the 
outputs they were producing, enabling 
ministers to make strategic decisions 
about whether they considered those 
outputs were adding value. 
In seeking to have the budget process 
examine the base as well as the margin, the 
same information set is required: that is, a 
clearly described set of outputs. The value 
of activities within the base is not a 
function of the level or type of expense, but 
of the services (or other interventions) that 
are produced. To examine the base, 
ministers need a clear picture of what 
services are produced. As the minister 
notes: ‘As a Government, we can’t ensure a 
joined-up, long-term approach to 
enhancing wellbeing, if we don’t actively 
look at what agencies are doing, and how 
it creates public value’ (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, the clear ex ante 
specification of outputs, the subsequent 
management of their production and their 
The description  
of the proposed 
changes to  
the Public Finance 
Act and the  
State Sector Act, 
taken together, 
suggests that  
they represent a 
move from one  
‘one-size-fits-all’ 
model to a different 
‘one-size fits-all’ 
model.
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costing, and their ex post reporting involves 
significant transaction costs. This runs 
against the minister’s intention to make the 
process ‘easier for agencies’: ‘It’s important 
for us to make it easier for agencies to plan, 
deliver and account for their work 
programmes, and to do it collaboratively, 
and cost-efficiently, with a minimum of 
waste’ (ibid.).
However, in the period since the act was 
first implemented there has been a 
progressive degradation in the quality of 
output specification, meaning that it is now 
more difficult for ministers to see clearly 
what departments are delivering. The 
transaction costs associated with the 
specification and reporting, ex ante and ex 
post respectively, of outputs means that 
unless this information is used by 
management, especially in the budget 
process, the incentives to continue to 
produce it are significantly weakened. The 
use of a baseline in the budgeting process 
reduces the incentives on departments to 
produce high-quality output information, 
as their revenue stream is not dependent 
on the production of that information. 
Similarly, high-quality information on 
output costs also has significant transaction 
costs, and if output costs do not play a 
significant role in determining 
departmental budgets there will be a 
reduced incentive to produce this 
information, leading to a degradation in 
information quality. In order for ministers 
to examine the base, whether through 
periodic spending reviews or as part of the 
annual budget process, the decline in the 
quality of this information will need to be 
reversed.
How do these proposed changes interrelate 
with the State Sector Act changes?
The close relationship between the Public 
Finance Act and State Sector Act at the 
time they were passed was noted above. 
This important interrelationship is also 
recognised by the current government in 
advancing its reform programme. And it is 
also recognised that the ‘[c]hanges to the 
State Sector Act 1988 will build on the high 
performance base of the Public Service, 
with the overall aim of delivering better 
outcomes and services for New Zealanders’ 
(State Services Commission, 2019).
One of the issues raised by the minister 
of state services in explaining the need for 
the repeal of the State Sector Act and its 
replacement with a Public Service Act is 
that the departmental form of organisation 
alone is not flexible enough to help us meet 
all the needs of New Zealanders. Over and 
again we have found the basic departmental 
form inflexible for: 
3.1 allowing different departments to 
work together to address complex 
problems which cross 
organisational boundaries; 
3.2 creating autonomy, or 
independence, without the cost 
and complexity of a separate 
department; 
3.3 creating greater visibility and 
strengthening accountability for 
important issues and priorities. 
(Hipkins, 2019b)
Building on the 2013 amendments to 
the State Sector Act, and the development 
of the System Design Toolkit, the changes 
proposed by the minister will give 
legislative backing to the following: an 
Interdepartmental Executive Board; public 
service joint ventures; a more flexible 
departmental agency model; and functional 
chief executives. In relation to these new 
organisational forms, the minister notes:
To give effect to these new organisational 
forms in legislation, some will require 
amendment to the Public Finance Act 
1989. These consequential amendments 
would not alter the fundamental 
elements of the public finance 
framework – parliamentary 
authorisation of  expenditure, 
transparency of objective setting and 
decision-making, and clear lines of 
accountability and reporting from 
officials to Ministers and Parliament. 
What would change is the range of 
administrative units able to become 
appropriation administrators, 
performance and strategic reporters 
and assume public finance 
responsibilities under the Act. (ibid., 
p.12)
This recognition of the need for 
appropriation system changes to reflect the 
new organisational forms reinforces the 
idea that the two pieces of legislation 
should be complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. 
The discussion above concerning a 
‘two-track’ system raises the possibility of 
having different operating modes within 
the public sector – outcome-focused 
collaboration and output-focused 
specialisation. The description of the 
proposed changes to the Public Finance Act 
and the State Sector Act, taken together, 
suggests that they represent a move from 
one ‘one-size-fits-all’ model to a different 
‘one-size-fits-all’ model. While this may 
have the merit of being a coherent system, 
it does not reflect the experience of the past 
30 years in two ways. First, for some 
activities an output-focused, hierarchical 
approach to management may be most 
efficient. Second, the range of activities in 
the public sector militates against a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach. While the original 
legislation went a considerable distance in 
enabling decision making in different 
organisations to reflect their individuality, 
the experience since has been that the 
system as a whole does not sufficiently 
accommodate the variation within the 
organisations that make up the public 
service.
... ministers 
acknowledge that  
the New Zealand 
public management 
system has produced 
good results and  
is highly regarded 
internationally and  
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but the ministers  
are nevertheless 
seeking further 
improvements. 
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Conclusion
The changes being proposed for the State 
Sector Act and the Public Finance Act 
are significant. They envisage a public 
management system that operates in a 
way that is significantly different to that 
originally envisaged by the acts, but in a 
way that reflects and extends a number 
of changes that have been formalised 
through amendments to both acts since 
their original passage.
Key elements of these changes include 
an intent to focus more on outcomes than 
outputs, a desire to give ministers and 
departments greater flexibility in the 
nature of appropriations and the selection 
of the services that will be provided within 
an appropriation, and a desire for the 
public service to operate in a more ‘joined-
up’, innovative and collaborative way. These 
changes reflect perceived issues in the 
operation of the system and the complexity 
of some of the problems New Zealand still 
faces. There is also an intent to change the 
budget process to make it both more 
efficient and more comprehensive, with 
reduced transaction costs and greater 
scrutiny of baseline expenditure.
A strength of the changes proposed by 
the ministers of state services and finance 
is that they maintain the complementarity 
of the two acts, emphasising the importance 
of a coherent public management system 
with consistent incentives on decision 
makers. The focus of both is firmly on 
wellbeing, both emphasise the importance 
of collaboration between departments, and 
both rely more heavily on the spirit of 
public service to drive performance than 
on clear accountabilities.
However, there are risks associated with 
the proposed changes, and this article 
identifies some of the tensions inherent in 
the nature of them. Both ministers 
acknowledge that the New Zealand public 
management system has produced good 
results and is highly regarded internationally 
and by New Zealanders, but the ministers 
are nevertheless seeking further 
improvements. The changes may or may 
not be successful. Or, perhaps the more 
likely result is that they are successful for 
some parts of the public sector, where the 
nature of the problems requires more 
flexible and experimental interventions, 
but less successful where the nature of the 
outputs and their relation to outcomes is 
better understood and production more 
routine. In the words of the Economist 
(1992), ‘[t]ime will tell’.
1 The different types of appropriation include appropriation 
for output expenses, other expenses, borrowing expenses 
and capital expenditure. There are also appropriations for 
benefits or related expenses (transfers) and multi-category 
appropriations.
2 For departments, outputs remain the basis for most 
appropriations, though there has been a pattern over time 
of aggregating outputs into fewer appropriations. This 
gives greater flexibility to departments at some cost to 
parliamentary authority in relation to the purpose of the 
authorised expenses.
3 Key challenges are the effort required to specify ex ante 
the service(s) that will be delivered in the budget period, 
and the measurement (including costing) and monitoring 
of the services actually delivered. For reasons that will be 
addressed below, there are also incentive issues with outputs 
as the basis for accountability. Because it is markedly easier 
to establish accountability for output delivery than for 
outcome achievement, departments have stronger incentives 
to ensure their outputs are delivered, and as a consequence, 
it is argued, departments are less willing to collaborate with 
other organisations in achieving outcomes.
4 As distinct from the assignment of decision rights between 
the Parliament, the ministers and departmental chief 
executives.
5 A number of speakers at the PFA30 conference, including 
the minister of finance and international speakers, referenced 
the high level of fiscal transparency.
6 While arguably part of the reason for the rapid introduction 
and successful functioning of the act, its integrated nature 
has been little emulated internationally, although the 
adoption of accrual reporting has been (Brumby, 2019).
7 Ownership performance relates to the aspects of an 
organisation’s performance that would be of interest 
to its owner, such as maintenance of capital, financial 
performance, organisational strategy and risk management. 
Purchase performance relates to the interests that a 
customer might have – including the nature of the product 
or service, the quantity and quality of the service, location 
of delivery and cost. These two interests – purchase and 
ownership – could conflict: for example, if a department 
were to run down capital to meet service demands. Accrual 
accounting was needed to measure performance on both 
dimensions – whether capital was being maintained 
(ownership) and the cost of services (purchase).
8 Both acts largely removed controls over inputs, other than 
the appropriation mechanism that specified total input costs. 
In exchange for freedom to manage inputs, departmental 
managers were accountable for the delivery of outputs. 
Through the strategy development and budget processes 
ministers determined the nature and level of services (or 
other interventions) required, based on the outcomes they 
were seeking to achieve.
9 This distinction required clarity as to the accountability of 
ministers and chief executives and departments. So, for 
example, ministers would determine and be accountable 
for the level of income tax, while Inland Revenue would be 
accountable for the collection of the tax, and associated 
services. Similarly, the Department of Conservation (DOC) 
would be accountable for the management of Crown assets 
such as the national parks. In these examples, tax revenue 
would be revenue of the Crown, not Inland Revenue, and the 
national parks would be on the Crown balance sheet, not 
DOC’s. 
10 Reporting of outputs was required in the Statement of 
Service Performance, and to emphasise the need for high-
quality information this statement was, like the financial 
statements, required to be audited.
11 In the international setting, the speed with which the 
accrual accounting systems were put in place in New 
Zealand is notable. Most departmental directors of finance 
(as they were then described) had little or no experience 
of establishing or operating an accrual-based accounting 
system, as this was not required in the context of a 
cash-based and Treasury-operated accounting system. In 
many cases, chief executives recruited new chief financial 
officers who had the requisite skills and experience. This 
process would have been significantly more difficult and 
time-consuming if the necessary skills, at both CFO and 
subordinate levels, had been developed internally rather than 
imported. 
12 Little (2018) suggests that the changes have led to a 
‘“patchwork” system’ and noted that: ‘The irony is that the 
overall effect of these changes can be to take us further away 
from a more meaningful performance framework.’
13 While outcomes were not formally the basis for chief 
executive accountability, in an environment where ministers 
were seeking to achieve their priority outcomes, chief 
executives had an incentive both to demonstrate how their 
department’s outputs contributed to the minister’s outcomes, 
and to seek improvements to the design or delivery of their 
outputs.
14 This pattern of diminishing the significance of outputs is 
illustrated by the use of terms such as ‘widgets’ to describe 
outputs. The progressive lessening of the specification and 
reporting requirements in relation to outputs in the formal 
system has the effect of reducing the transaction costs of the 
system, but runs counter to the point that it is only through 
the production of outputs (or other interventions) that 
outcomes can be achieved; outcomes cannot themselves be 
directly achieved without some form of intervention.
15 The introduction of strategic result areas (SRAs), the Better 
Public Services initiative, the social investment approach 
and the Living Standards Framework all represent attempts 
to find a way of better managing the achievement of 
outcomes.
16 At the time it was removed from the act, ‘outcome’ was 
defined as: ‘outcome – (a) means a state or condition of 
society, the economy, or the environment; and (b) includes a 
change in that state or condition’ (s2(1)).
17 Departments were required to report on their service delivery, 
though not the outcomes achieved. This requirement was 
amended a number of times and now refers to ‘operations’ 
and ‘strategic intentions’.
18 In the period since the minister made this speech the 
government has introduced the Public Finance (Wellbeing) 
Amendment Bill. 
19 It is possible that the minister did not refer to this potential 
reform because it would not be given effect through an 
amendment to the Public Finance Act, but through separate 
legislation. It would, however, constitute a significant change 
to the performance management system.
20 For example, the appropriation system could be changed 
by making significantly greater use of multi-category 
appropriations and/or multi-year appropriations, without 
necessitating changes to the act.
21 The reporting entity for the forecast and actual financial 
statements of the Crown comprises ministers of the Crown, 
departments, offices of Parliament, the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(the core Crown segment); state-owned enterprises, mixed-
ownership model companies, Air New Zealand Limited, 
Kiwi Group Holdings Limited (the state-owned enterprises 
sector); the Crown entities sector; plus other entities not fully 
consolidated into the financial statements of the government, 
principally tertiary education institutions.
22 The government also produces unaudited monthly financial 
statements, except for the first two months and the last 
month of the year.
23  Information in the government’s financial statements is 
the basis for assessing conformance with the principles of 
responsible fiscal management contained in the act. 
24  It should be noted that recent amendments to the Public 
Finance Act have included reporting requirements in the 
appropriation part of the act. Specifically, sections 15C 
(End-of-year performance information requirements) and 
15EA (Main Appropriation Bill: supporting information 
relating to child poverty) require information that relate to 
wellbeing status rather than to plans. Clearly distinguishing 
ex ante objectives and ex post achievements enables clearer 
communication about achievements relative to plans, and 
thus more effective accountability.
25 It may be that the four-yearly report is intended to be similar 
to the Investment Statement, a document that is required 
by section 26NA of the act to be prepared by the Treasury 
at least every four years. However, this statement is largely 
based on information that has already been reported in the 
financial statements, which are the formal ex post reporting 
documents. It is not clear where the equivalent formal 
reporting of wellbeing achievements is intended to take 
place, if not in the proposed Treasury report.
26 In this article I will use the term ‘achievements’ in relation 
to wellbeing performance. However, it has been noted 
above that the attribution problem means it is difficult or 
impossible to demonstrate that the wellbeing changes are 
the result of government action. Notwithstanding this, it is 
central to the reforms the government is considering that it 
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